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By GURDIP S.  BAKSHI AND ZHIWU CHEN* 
In existing theory, wealth is no more valuable than its implied consumption  're- 
wards. In reality investors acquire wealth not just for  its implied consumption, 
but  for the resulting social status. Max M. Weber refers to this desire for wealth 
as the spirit of capitalism. We examine, both analytically and empirically, im- 
plications  of  Weber's hypothesis for  consumption, savings,  and stock prices. 
When  investors care about relative social status, propensity to consume and risk- 
taking behavior wvill  depend on social standards, and stock  prices will be volatile. 
The spirit of capitalism seems to be a driving  force behind stock-market  volatility 
and economic growth. (JEL G1, G10, GI1, G12) 
In neoclassic  economic  models, the accu- 
mulation of wealth is often taken to be solely 
driven by one's desire to increase consumption 
rewards.  This assumption  is best demonstrated 
by the objective function in most consumption- 
portfolio and growth models: 
rm 
max  Et  u(c, -r)  d-r, 
CT,,O:T  Zr  [ t,-)  t 
subject to certain lifetime budget constraints, 
where u(,  ) is the utility of consumption; 
Wt  and Ct are respectively  time t wealth and 
consumption; and at  stands for some  other 
controls, such as portfolio weights.  In those 
models,  wealth is clearly no more. valuable 
than the maximum amount of  consumption 
utility  that it can bring. Because  consump- 
tion rewards are the only things that matter, 
everything has to be valued according to its 
relation  with  consumption.  Thus,  for  in- 
stance,  the equilibrium price of  an asset is 
completely  determined by  its  consumption 
beta (Douglass  T. Breeden, 1979; Robert E. 
Lucas Jr., 1978). 
While  the  aforementioned motive  is  an 
important-perhaps  the  most  important 
motive for wealth accumulation, it is,  how- 
ever, not the only important  motive behind the 
sometimes relentless acquisition of wealth, in 
part  because biological needs as well as social 
norms and customs put a limit on how much 
an individual can consume. To quote from Lee 
Iacocca (1988): 
Once you reach a certain level in a ma- 
terial way, what more can you do? You 
can't eat more than three meals a day; 
you'll kill yourself. You can't wear two 
suits one over the other. You might now 
have three cars in your garage-but  six! 
Oh, you can indulge yourself, but only 
to a point. [Iacocca, 1988 p. 67] 
Harold L.  Cole et al. (1992)  argue that the 
consumption motive fails to explain why such 
already rich  individuals  as  Donald  Trump 
"continue to work long days, endure substan- 
tial  amounts of  stress,  and  take  enormous 
risks,"  for  "he  seems  to have more money 
than he could spend in several life times" (pp. 
1115-16).  A  possible  counter argument to 
Iacocca and Cole et al. is that they save and 
acquire more wealth not just for themselves 
but also  for their offspring. This  argument, 
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however, is not consistent with the empirical 
evidence that no significant difference exists 
in the rate of asset decumulation between the 
elderly with and without children (Michael D. 
Hurd, 1986).  Given that increasing consump- 
tion rewards cannot be the sole motive behind 
wealth acquisition, it may not be  surprising 
that consumption-based asset pricing, savings, 
and growth models have failed to consistently 
explain the relevant real-life data. Among the 
most damaging pieces of evidence, aggregate 
consumption is too smooth to justify the vol- 
atile stock returns.' 
Building on work by Chen (1990),  Cole et 
al.  (1992),  Arthur J.  Robson  (1992),  and 
Heng-Fu Zou (1992,  1994),  we  examine in 
the present paper, both analytically and em- 
pirically,  the  implications  for  consumption, 
portfolio holdings and stock-market prices of 
the  hypothesis  that  investors  accumulate 
wealth not only for the sake of consumption 
but also for wealth-induced social status. Ac- 
cording to Max M. Weber (1958),  this hy- 
pothesis  essentially  captures  the  spirit  of 
capitalism: 
Man  is  dominated by  the  making  of 
money,  by  acquisition as  the  ultimate 
purpose of his life. Economic acquisition 
is  no  longer  subordinated to  man  as 
the means for the satisfaction of his ma- 
terial needs.  This reversal of  what we 
should call  the natural relationship, so 
irrational  from a naive point of view, is 
evidently a leading principle of capital- 
ism. (Weber, 1958 p. 53) 
This view  of  the capitalistic spirit has been 
shared by many other contemporary and past 
economists  including Adam  Smith, John S. 
Mill, J. Schumpeter, and John M. Keynes.2 In 
the case of Keynes (1971),  he wrote: 
... society was so framed as to throw a 
great part of the increased income into 
the control of  the class  least likely  to 
consume it. The new rich ... preferred  the 
power which investment gave  them to 
the pleasures of immediate consumption 
... Herein lay, in fact, the main justifi- 
cation of the capitalist system ... And so 
the cake increased; but to what end was 
not clearly contemplated ... Saving was 
for old age or their children;  but this was 
only in theory-the  virtue of  the cake 
was that it was never to be consumed, 
neither by you nor by your children after 
you. (pp. 11-12) 
As  in  Robson  (1992),  we  formalize  the 
spirit-of-capitalism hypothesis  by  assuming 
each investor's lifetime preferences are rep- 
resentable in the following form 
00 
e -PtEt  { u ( Ct, St) I dt, 
where St is the investor's relative social stand- 
ing. We postulate St is  strictly increasing in 
wealth (so as to reflect the spirit of capitalism) 
but decreasing in social-wealth standards (so 
that status is only relative). In explaining why 
in a capitalist society the pursuit of wealth is 
in part for the sake of wealth-enhanced status, 
Robert H. Frank (1985)  observes that human 
beings face constant contests for position in 
society and relative status often dictates who 
gets to receive the prizes. Cole et al. (1992), 
for  instance,  argue  that  wealth  determines 
status, which in turn regulates such things as 
marriage patterns.3 In particular, they  show 
that if that is the case, the reduced form pref- 
erences of investors will take the general struc- 
ture as given above. In this sense, we can treat 
their analysis as providing a micro foundation 
for the preferences studied here. 
Economies populated with status-conscious 
investors exhibit characteristics distinct from 
those with the standard  agents. To mention a 
' For empirical studies on the consumption-based  pric- 
ing theory, see, among others, Lars P. Hansen and Ravi 
Jagannathan (1991,  1994),  Hansen  and  Kenneth  J. 
Singleton  (1982),  and Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. 
Prescott (1985). The general conclusion is that the smooth 
consumption process cannot explain the observed stock 
prices, unless the representative agent's risk aversion is 
unrealistically high. 
2 See Zou (1992,  1994) for a review of the history of 
economic thought and more references on this topic. 
'They  quote from Madonna's song Material Girl that 
"The boy with the cold hard cash is always Mister Right 
..." and from Harold J. Perkin (1969) that "the pursuit of 
wealth was the pursuit  of social status, not merely for one- 
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few examples, optimal consumption-portfolio 
plans will be functions of not only one's own 
wealth  and preference parameters but  also 
social-wealth standards. Under one  of  three 
parametrized-preference  models in this paper, 
the optimal propensity to consume is increas- 
ing in both one's relative social standing and 
own wealth but decreasing in (i) social-wealth 
standards (so  as  to  "catch  up  with  the 
Joneses"),  (ii)  the investor's aversion to pov- 
erty, and (iii)  the degree to which the investor 
cares  about status. Further, the  investor  is 
more averse to wealth risk (i)  the more he 
cares about status, (ii)  the higher the social- 
wealth  standards, or (iii)  the lower  the in- 
vestor' s  social  standing.  These  and  other 
characterizations  have many important  impli- 
cations for consumption, savings,  and port- 
folio  choice  behavior.  In  such  economies, 
even  if  the consumption process is  smooth, 
stock prices can be quite volatile. The spirit 
of capitalism is a driving force behind stock- 
market volatility. 
To  test the spirit-of-capitalism hypothesis 
that wealth acquisition is more than  just for its 
consumption rewards, we  subject the asset- 
pricing  equation  under  one  parametrized- 
preference model to monthly U.S.  data. The 
test  methods used  include  the  Hansen and 
Jagannathan ( 1991 )  volatility-bound  diag- 
nostics,  Hansen  and  Jagannathan ( 1994) 
specification-error  tests,  and  the  Hansen 
(1982)  generalized  method  of*  moments 
(GMM)  tests. Overall, the estimated values 
and signs of the preference  parameters  are sup- 
portive of the hypothesis. In particular,  when 
compared to the standard  expected-utility the- 
ory, our preference model that takes into ac- 
count concerns about wealth-induced status 
does a better  job in explaining empirically ob- 
served stock prices. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In 
Section  I,  we  first introduce the preference 
structure  as well as three  parametrized  models, 
and then define the investor's consumption- 
portfolio problem. A general asset-pricing re- 
sult  is  also  given  there. Section  II  studies 
closed-form  solutions  to  the  consumption- 
portfolio  problem  under  the  parametrized- 
preference models. Section III presents results 
from the empirical  tests. Section IV offers con- 
cluding remarks.  Proof of each result is given 
in Appendix A,  and description of  the data 
used in the tests is provided in Appendix B. 
I. A General  Framework  with 
the Spirit  of Capitalism 
In this section, we  first outline a class  of 
preferences that depend  on  relative  wealth 
status and then offer a general characterization 
of the consumption-portfolio problem. Asset- 
pricing equations are also presented without 
assuming parametric  functional forms for the 
preferences. 
A.  Preferences 
Assume there is a sole perishable consump- 
tion good that is  also used as the value nu- 
meraire.  For  a  generic  investor,  let  his 
consumption (flow)  and relative wealth status 
be, respectively, C, and St, from time t to (t + 
At). The preferences  of this infinitely-lived in- 
vestor are assumed to be representable  by 
(1)  E  e-PtEo[u(Ct,St)]  At, 
t E  I 0,At,2At....  ) 
where p is the time-preference parameter  and 
At the time length in-between decision points. 
In addition to requiring  that u (Ct, St) be twice 
continuously differentiable,  we impose the fol- 
lowing restrictions: uc  >  0 (more consump- 
tion is strictly better), us >  0 (higher status is 
strictly preferred), and ucc  <  0  (utility  in- 
creases in  consumption but at a  decreasing 
speed), where a subscript  on u denotes the par- 
tial derivative of u with respect to the corre- 
sponding argument. In Robson (1992),  u is 
assumed to be convex in status, that is, uss < 
0. As for the cross partial  derivative,  ucs, it can 
take either sign. If the Harry M. Markowitz 
(1952)  hypothesis holds,4 we will have ucs  < 
'According  to Markowitz (1952), an increase (or de- 
crease)  in  wealth  will  shift  an  investor's  utility-of- 
consumption curve to the right (or the left). An interpre- 
tation of  his hypothesis is  that each time an investor's 
wealth status changes, it essentially causes him to go back 
and  rerank the  entire consumption set,  such  that the 
wealthier the investor, the less utility from a given unit of 
consumption. In some  sense, this means an increase in 
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0; otherwise, ucs 2  0. For our general discus- 
sion, we  leave both second-order derivatives 
unrestricted  in sign. 
The relative wealth-status variable, St, de- 
serves a few clarifications. First, assume St is 
strictly increasing in  the investor's  absolute 
wealth at time t, denoted by Wt,  so that higher 
wealth means higher status regardless of the 
wealth distribution for  the  group of  people 
with whom the investor has social or profes- 
sional contacts. Second, assume St is a func- 
tion of the social group to which the investor 
belongs, so that for a given level of wealth Wt, 
the investor's relative status  will be high (low) 
if  he  compares himself  to  a  group of  low- 
income (high-income) consumers.5  While the 
investor's relative status should in general de- 
pend on the entire wealth distribution of his 
reference group, we assume that St is only a 
function of W, and V,: 
(2)  St=  f' Wt'VO) 
for somef(,  ) such that  fw >  0 and  fv  <  0, 
where Vt is what determines "middle class" 
within the investor's reference group. We refer 
to Vt  as the social-wealth index. It should be 
emphasized that for different consumers, their 
wealth references, Vt, can be quite different, 
depending on the social or professional groups 
to which they compare themselves. The higher 
the incomes of the members in the reference 
group, the higher V,. Substituting (2)  into the 
period utility u(Ce, St) gives the induced util- 
ity: U(Ct, Wt, V)  =u[C,,f(W,,  Vi)], where 
U(Ct,  Wt, V,) is also twice continuously dif- 
ferentiable, with Uc >  0,  Ucc  <  0,  Uw >  0, 
Uv <0. 
The following three parametrized  models of 
preferences are useful for later sections. 
Model 1.-Absolute  wealth is status: St  = 
Wt, with the period utility given by 
(3)  U(Ct, Wt, VO)  =  1  Wtx, 
where y >  0, and X  A  0 when y  2  1 and X < 
0 otherwise. The magnitude, I  X  I  , measures  the 
extent to which the investor cares about status. 
This specification is consistent with those 
in Mordecai Kurz (1968),  Chen (1990),  and 
Zou  (1992,  1994)  as  well  as  with  the 
previous  quotes  from  Weber  (1958)  and 
Keynes (1971)  . Note that since any reason- 
able notion of  the spirit of capitalism must 
have status strictly increasing in wealth Wt, 
we  can  think of  Model  1 as capturing the 
first-order effect  of  wealth on status deter- 
mination  and  hence  on  the  period  utility. 
This is particularly true when the wealth dis- 
tribution for the reference group and Vt are 
constant over time, because in that case the 
utility in (3)  can be treated as the reduced- 
form of u[ Ct,  f ( Wt  ,  V,) ]. 
Model 2.-  The ratio of one's  own wealth 
to the social-wealth index determines status: 
St =  W,/V,, with the utility given by 
(4)  U(Ct, Wt. Vt)  C  -  (W,) 
where  the  parameters are  as  restricted in 
Model 1. This model also coincides with one 
in which the wealth contribution to utility is 
purely external. 
Here, an investor is said to be in the middle 
class if St =  1, in the lower-wealth class if St < 
1, and in the upper class otherwise. Model 2 
collapses to Model 1 when the index Vt  is con- 
stant over time. 
Model 3.-Self-perception  determines hap- 
piness: St =  Wt/Vt but the utility given by 
Cl  -  y 
(5)  U(Ct, Wt. Vt) =  (Wt  KVt)x, 
1-  7 
5 This assumption seems natural in light of James S. 
Duesenberry's (1949 p. 48) observation: "Consider two 
groups with the same incomes. One group associates with 
people who have the same income as they have. The other 
group associates with people who have higher incomes 
than the members of the group. ... The two groups have 
the same income but the first will be better satisfied with 
its position than the second. Its members will make fewer 
unfavorable  comparisons ..." (Duesenberry also provides 
early survey data demonstrating  a positive connection be- 
tween relative status and happiness.) Frank (1985) refers 
to status relative to one's  group of close  association as 
local status. He emphasizes that local status is of more 
concern to consumers than global status, because "Neg- 
ative feelings are much more strongly evoked by adverse 
comparisons with our immediate associates than by those 
with people who are distant in place or time"  (p. 9). In 
this sense, per-capita wealth for the whole country, for 
instance, may not be a good wealth reference for every 
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for some constant K  2  0, where y  and X are 
as restricted  in Model 1 and KV,  is the inves- 
tor's self-assessed reservation or subsistence 
wealth level. 
Two  points  are worth  noting.  First,  the 
utility  in  (5)  is  increasing  both  in  W,/Vt, 
which measures relative standing in the ob- 
jective  wealth  distribution,  and  in  (W,  - 
KV,),  which is the perceived position relative 
to  the  investor' s  reservation-wealth  level. 
Second,  W, in  Model  3  should  never  be 
less  than or equal  to  the  subsistence  level 
KV,  (because  otherwise  the utility  function 
would  not be well  defined).  For a given  K 
value,  this puts  a strong restriction on  the 
investor' s  consumption-portfolio  behavior. 
An intuitive interpretation of this restriction 
follows.  Suppose  K  =  1. Then, the investor 
will  never tolerate a wealth level  below  the 
social-wealth index (average)  Vt, that is, the 
investor cannot tolerate the possibility of de- 
scending  to  the  middle-  or  lower-wealth 
class.  Since  the  coefficient  K  reflects  part 
of  the  investor's  preferences,  different  in- 
vestors  will  have  different  values  for  K. 
Presumably, a consumer  who  was  born to 
a low-wealth  family  can  absorb economic 
hardships much better than someone born to 
a well-to-do family, in which case the former 
will  have a lower  K  value,  or is  said to be 
less averse to poverty, than the latter. Based 
on  this  observation,  we  refer  to  K  as  the 
poverty-aversion  coefficient.  Of  course,  if 
one' s wealth is low, it may not be feasible to 
have a high  K value. In this sense,  the poor 
cannot feasibly  imitate the rich by showing 
off with a high aversion to poverty. When K 
=  0, Model 3 also becomes  Model  1. 
In some sense, Models 2  and 3  share the 
same spirit with, respectively, (i)  Andrew B. 
Abel's ( 1990) "catching up with the Joneses" 
model in which he defines the period utility as 
a function of the ratio of one's own to aggre- 
gate consumption and (ii)  John Y. Campbell 
and John H. Cochrane's (1995)  habit forma- 
tion model in which consumption felicity is a 
function of the difference between one's own 
and aggregate consumption. In drawing this 
comparison,  however,  one  should  keep  in 
mind that in our case the wealth reference V, 
is group specific and not necessarily the ag- 
gregate wealth. 
B.  The Consumption-Portfolio  Problem 
To  introduce the investor's  consumption- 
portfolio problem, assume that traded in this 
frictionless  economy  is  one  risk-free asset, 
with its constant  rate of return  given by ro, and 
N risky assets with their prices at time t de- 
noted by Pi,,, for i =  1, ..., N and t E [0, oo). 
These  asset prices follow  a vector-diffusion 
process: 
(6)  dPit =  Ii,t dt + ai,t dui,t 
Pi,t 
where  lji,t and ai,t are, respectively, the con- 
ditional expected value and standard  deviation 
of the rate of return on asset i per unit time, 
and wi,t  is a standard  Wiener process. The vari- 
ables,  qi,t and ai,t, generally depend on  the 
time t state of the economy. 
To maintain a level  of  simplicity, assume 
that one  individual investor's consumption- 
portfolio decision will have at most a negli- 
gible  impact on  the  social-wealth  index  Vt 
(thinking of  this index as reflecting a large 
group's average wealth level).  Consumption- 
portfolio  rebalancing by  the  investor  takes 
place at discrete intervals of  length At.  Let 
the portfolio vector, at  (ao,t, al,t, ..., aN,t) 
be such that ai,t is the fraction of time t sav- 
ings  invested in  asset  i  and zI  =0  ai,t =  1. 
The infinitely-lived capitalistic investor then 
chooses a plan, { (Ct,  oft): t =  0, At,  ...}, so 
as to 
00 
(7)  max  Y, e-PtEoU(Ct, Wt, Vt) At 
(Ct,ad)  t=o 
subject to the budget constraints 
(8)  Wt+At-Wt=  {roWt-Ct 
N 
+  Wt  E  ai,t(i,t  -  ro)}  At 
N 
+  Wt E  ai,t ait  AZwi,t 
i=A 
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Assume that {(C*,  a*):  t =  0, At,  ...}  is 
an optimal plan for (7).  Following  a varia- 
tional argument in Sanford J. Grossman and 
Robert  J. Shiller (1982),  we arrive at the nec- 
essary Euler equation: 
(9)  DPt=etEt  Uc(Ct+At,  Wt*,  V +) 
+  Uw(Ct*+  At, Wt*+ At, Vt + At)  At p  A 
uc  (Ct*  I  Wt*  I  Vt)  i,+  t- 
The price of  an asset should thus equal the 
expected future benefit that the asset can gen- 
erate in terms of  today's utility. This Euler 
equation differs  from its  state-independent 
expected-utility-based counterpart  in that the 
intertemporal  marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption (IMRS),  denoted by mt, is now 
a function of the investor's consumption, his 
wealth and the social-wealth index. Therefore, 
in an economy populated with capitalistic in- 
vestors, we  expect  its  IMRS to  be  volatile 
when the individual wealth processes and the 
social-wealth index are so. This is true even 
if  the individual-consumption processes  are 
quite smooth. 
The discrete-time  Euler  equation  in (9) is the 
basis for the empirical  tests reported  in Section 
IV. Other than for the empirical tests, we are, 
from now on, mainly interested  in characteriz- 
ing solutions to (7) in the continuous-time  limit 
(i.e.,  as At  --  0).  We first present a pricing 
characterization  in Subsection C below. 
C.  Asset-Price Restrictions 
Assume  that in  the continuous-time limit 
both the investor's optimal consumption and 
the social-wealth index follow a diffusion pro- 
cess: 
dC* 
( 10)  C*=  iC,t  dt + (7, t d(A)C,  t. 
t 
(11)  dVt  I  dt +  av,t  dwv,t 
where pc,t9  ac,t  t,t  and cv,t generally depend 
on the state of the economy, and wc,t and wv,t 
are standard  Wiener processes. A justification 
for this assumption is that when asset prices 
and  optimal  consumption  follow  diffusion 
processes,  the  resulting social-wealth  index 
should be expected to follow  a diffusion as 
well. In particular,  based on (8),  each individ- 
ual investor's optimal wealth must then follow 
a diffusion. 
PROPOSITION  1.  Suppose  that  in  the 
continuous-time  limit,  the  vector-diffusion 
process  {(C*,  W*):  t E  [0,  oo)}  is the in- 
vestor's  optimal  consumption-wealth  path. 
Then,  the  risk  premium  on  asset  i  must 
satisfy 
(12)  pi,t-  ro  -  U  i,C 
Uc 
W* UCW  _UCV 
-o?i,  --?*i, 
Vi = 0, 1, ... , N, 
where ai,c,  aiu,  and ai,  are the covariances 
of  asset  i's  return  with,  respectively,  the 
individual  investor's  consumption  growth, 
his  wealth  growth,  and  the growth  on  the 
social-wealth  index,  that  is,  oi,  dt  3 
covt(dPj,t IPj,t,  dC*IC*),  vi,wdta 
covt(dPj,t1Pj,,  dW*IW*),  and  ai,  dt 
covt(dPi  t1Pj,,  dVtlVt),  with  covt(,  ) 
being the conditional  covariance  operator. 
Equation (12)  implies that in an economy 
populated  with  capitalistic  investors,  con- 
sumption risk is not the only risk that should 
be  compensated  for  in  equilibrium,  as 
Breeden's (1979)  consumption-based capital- 
asset-pricing  model  (CAPM)  predicts.  In- 
stead, the expected-risk premium for a risky 
asset is determined  by its covariation  with each 
investor's consumption, his  wealth, and the 
social-wealth index. Intuitively, when inves- 
tors care about relative social standing, they 
will hedge not only against future consump- 
tion uncertainty  but also against those factors 
that affect their future status. Since one's so- 
cial  status is  determined by  both  his  own 
wealth and the social-wealth index, risks that 
are correlated  with these two variables should 
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To further appreciate Proposition 1, apply 
the utility of Model 1 to (12)  to yield 
(13)  A i,-ro  =  7Yci,c  +  Xui,W 
which appears to resemble the pricing equa- 
tion of Larry G. Epstein and Stanley E. Zin 
( 1991 eq. 24) or Darrell  J. Duffie and Epstein 
( 1992 eq. 21 ) in the sense that  equilibrium  risk 
premium is determined by the covariance of 
the asset with both consumption and wealth 
growth. But, their model is fundamentally  dif- 
ferent from ours. In the case of Epstein and 
Zin where they examine a particular  class of 
recursive preferences, wealth enters the pric- 
ing equation and the IMRS as a stand-in for 
tomorrow's utility index, whereas here wealth 
risk also  matters because the investor cares 
about wealth-induced status. As will be noted 
later, however, the discrete-time  pricing equa- 
tion under Model 1 is distinct from the coun- 
terpart  in Epstein and Zin (eq.  16).  Besides, 
the two models impose different restrictions 
on y and X.  To see this, recall that  under  Model 
1, X  2  0 if -y  2  1 and X <  0 otherwise. Under 
Epstein and Zin's model, the restriction  is that 
y > Oif X<  1; y < Oif X>  1; and y  = Oif 
X =  1. This is the case because the parameters 
X and y here have the following  correspon- 
dence with their notation: 
A=  1-7  and  y= 
where j  is their "y"  and -f >  0 is their elas- 
ticity coefficient (a).  Thus, one can still em- 
pirically distinguish our Model  1 from their 
model. 
Substituting the utility in (4)  of  Model 2 
into (12)  yields 
(14)  Ai,  -  ro =  yaj,  + A  -  Xu 
Given -y  2  1 and X >  0, this implies that if an 
asset is positively correlated with the inves- 
tor'  s consumption or wealth, it deserves a pos- 
itive consumption or wealth-risk premium. In 
the mean time, the more positively correlated 
an asset is with the social-wealth index, the 
less risk premium it deserves, which may not 
come as a surprise.  To see this, note that  fixing 
the investor's wealth level, a rise in Vt  leads to 
a decline in the investor's social status (St = 
W,/V,). Thus, an asset that is positively cor- 
related with  V, should  be  desirable to  the 
investor because adding it to the portfolio will 
increase the correlation between  W, and Vt, 
which helps better insure against future status 
uncertainty  and allows the investor to "catch 
up with the Joneses." 
Under the class of preferences in Model 3, 
equation (12)  becomes 
(15)  ILi,,- ro  =  yai,  +  A  W'  Vvi 
KWVt-  , 
Wt*-KVt 
Again, the more positively correlated an asset 
is with Vt, the less risk premium it deserves. 
Unlike in Model 2, however, this type of econ- 
omy  will  typically experience stochastic in- 
vestment opportunities in the sense  that the 
risk premium, (fi,t  -  ro),  will  depend on W*t 
and Vt. 
Before closing this section, note that if we 
adopt the  common  assumption of  identical 
preferences  but possibly different  endowments 
across investors in the economy, the pricing 
restriction in (14)  under Model 2 (and hence 
Model 1) also applies to aggregate consump- 
tion and wealth-so  long as all investors com- 
pare themselves to the same exogenous wealth 
standard Vt. To briefly see this, suppose that 
there are K exogenous  state variables, xt  = 
(xl  t 9...,  xK,t),  following  a  joint  vector- 
diffusion  process.  By  using  the  solution 
method in  Subsections  A  and B  (see  also 
Robert  C. Merton, 1971), we have the optimal 
consumption for Model  2  given  by:  C *  = 
g(xt,  t)W*,  for some  "well-behaved"  func- 
tion g(xt,  t).  Substituting this solution into 
(14)  and applying Ito's  lemma,  we  arrive, 
upon rearranging,  at (16)  below. Since inves- 
tors are identical (except in endowments), the 
propensity to consume, g, is also identical for 
them. Summing this equation across all inves- 
tors and reversing the above derivation yield 
(17)  below, where W, is aggregate wealth at 
t,  and  ai,w)  is  the  covariance between 
return on asset i and aggregate-consumption 
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(16)  W,*(-i,,  -ro) 
KlIOg  I  __-  dP  W>  =W*[  E  . covt(p'  dXk,  -  Xiu  e  ) dot  dWP, 
k ~gO0xkdt  (Pi'td  dt  P' 
(17)  1  i(tdPit  EV  dx,  dW+  ) +yo-,1Y  Xo-,V 
=i't 
-  r 
7Cigx  I  w, 
Xk 
= 7Oj,F  +  Yc7j,,  -  XO>,V 
claim.6 If investors differ in preferences or in 
wealth reference groups, however,  aggrega- 
tion may be  difficult to  obtain. In addition, 
as  the  solution  structure in  Subsection  C 
implies,  aggregation may  not  obtain under 
Model 3 even when investors have identical 
preferences. 
II. Consumption,  Saving,  and Portfolio  Choice 
This section uses the parametrized  prefer- 
ences in Models 1, 2, and 3 to study optimal 
consumption, saving, and portfolio rules in de- 
tail. To economize the discussion, assume that 
there are only two traded assets, a risky stock 
and a risk-free bond, and that trading  and con- 
sumption decision making takes place contin- 
uously over time. The price of the stock and 
the social-wealth index follow  two  separate 
geometric Brownian motions, that is, the co- 
efficients in  (6)  and (11)  are all constants: 
IL,t=  bI,  a  t=  a9,  V t=  ,uv,  and  v,  =  av,  for 
some positive ,t, a, ,tv,  and av. Under this and 
the continuous decision-making assumption, 
the investor's problem in  (7)  can be  reex- 
pressed as solving at each time t E [0, oo) 
(18)  J(Wt, Vt) 
max  E,ff  e-p(s-t)  X 
U(CS,  Ws, Vs) ds} 
subject to 
(19)  dWt=  {Wt[ro  +  at(A-ro)] 
-  Ct } dt + ataWt dwt, 
where at is now the fraction of  savings  in- 
vested  in  the  risky  stock,  wt the  standard 
Wiener process governing the return on the 
stock, and the other notation is the same as 
before.  Let  al,  be  the covariance  between 
the return on the risky stock and the growth 
rate of Vt. The first-order condition for (18) 
yields 
(20)  JW(Wf,  Vt) =  Uc(Ct,  W,,  Vt) 
1  -  ro  VtJvw a I, 
(21)  a=  RRA  52  WJRaRA  t  29 
6 Since Model  1 is free of  V,  the above aggregation 
argument holds even  if  investors face  different wealth 
standards. In the case  of  Model  2,  however,  not only 
should the investors refer to the same wealth standard,  but 
also  the  wealth  standard should be  exogenous  to  the 
model,  in  order for  this  aggregation argument to  go 
through.  The assumption  of an exogenous wealth standard 
may not be  restrictive when examining an individual's 
consumption-portfolio  decision, but when aggregation is 
the concern this seems quite restrictive.  It is hard  to imag- 
ine that the wealth index in the aggregate is still exoge- 
nous, and in a true general equilibrium the social-wealth 
index should be endogenized, which is a topic beyond the 
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where RRA  -  (W,Jww/Jw)  is  the Arrow- 
Pratt  relative risk aversion in wealth. The op- 
timal proportion of  savings  invested  in  the 
risky asset is  thus linear in both the market 
price of  risk and the investor's relative risk 
tolerance. However, unlike in the case of the 
standard state-independent expected  utility, 
the optimal portfolio also  depends on  both 
how the investor cares about social standing 
and how the risky stock is correlated  with the 
social-wealth level. 
A.  Model 1: Absolute Wealth  Is Status 
Let's first examine the case of Model 1 be- 
cause it represents a relatively simple bench- 
mark  that  renders  the  comparative  statics 
easier to see. Since Model 1 is a special case 
of Model 2, we report  the general result under 
Model 2 below. 
PROPOSITION 2.  Let the utility be as given 
in (4).  Then, the optimal solution to the con- 
sumption-portfolio  problem in (18)  is 
(22)  C*=  W* 
(23)  a* 
I 
-r  1  + a1,V  a 2  y  +  A  2  + 
(24)  J(Wt, Vt) =  t 
where 
-(  + A-)I  + (7+  A  -I)ro -A,U 
2  2  y +x 
77:0,y+A:  1. 
The  restriction  that  iq 2  0 and y +  X 2  1 is 
demanded by the transversality condition for 
the infinite-horizon problem. Given the utility 
of wealth in (24),  the relative risk aversion in 
wealth is simply RRA =  y +  X, which is in 
contrast with the fact that under the standard 
expected utility, the relative-risk-aversion  co- 
efficient is  y. As noted earlier, when the in- 
vestor prefers higher social  status, we  have 
X :Oify  ? 1  andA < Oif  y  <  1. Sincethe 
above solution requires y +  A ?  1, the inter- 
nally permissible parameter values can only 
be: -y ?  1 and A >  0, which is what the re- 
mainder of this section is based on. The more 
the investor cares about status, the more risk 
averse he becomes. 
Model 1 is obtained from Model 2 by letting 
Vt  be a constant, which means by choosing liv 
= 0 and a,  = 0. Substituting  these values into 
(22)  and (23)  yields the optimal policy under 
Model 1: 
(25)  7W,t 
(26)  at=  r2  +1 
where 
~~~Y~1Tro +- 
-1  r  _-  rop2 
2 y +  X (  a  )IJ 
By  (26),  the optimal proportion invested in 
the risky stock is decreasing in both y and X: 
Oa0*4/fry  < 0 and Oa* /  OX < 0. Then, the more 
the  investor  cares  about wealth  status, the 
higher the coefficient X and hence the less the 
investor will hold of the risky stock. This is 
because in this case caring about wealth status 
makes the investor more risk averse. 
By (25),  the propensity to consume, q,  is 
decreasing in  X: OA/lOX  <  0.  The more the 
investor cares about status, the higher the sav- 
ings rate. To see the implications of this for 
economic growth, note that (19)  and (25)  to- 
gether result in 
dC,*  dW,* 
(27)  C,*  W,* 
Qdt+  + X>d)wt  , 
where  p,  ro/y + ((y  +  1)/2y(y  + X))((u  - 
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impact of  an increase in  A on  /uw  and [u,  is 
clouded by two opposite effects: the portfolio 
effect and the savings effect. On the one hand, 
when the investor  cares more about status (i.e., 
A  is higher), his risk aversion  in wealth,  RRA = 
y +  X, will increase,  which means holding less 
of the risky stock and a lower a!.  This implies 
the first  part  of expected wealth growth in (19) 
will be lower. Consequently,  the increased  risk 
aversion asserts a  negative effect  on  wealth 
growth. On the other  hand, an increase  in X in- 
duces the investor  to consume less and raise the 
savings rate, which means the second part of 
expected growth  in (19) will be higher. 
In economic growth models the existence of 
a sole investment asset is often assumed, pre- 
sumably to isolate the savings effect from the 
portfolio  effect.  To  adopt  that  assumption 
here, let the sole asset be the risky stock. Then, 
there is no portfolio choice involved and every 
dollar saved is fully invested in the sole asset: 
at* =  1. Substituting  this into (19),  (25),  and 
(26)  and rearranging  the terms yield a new set 
of wealth dynamics: 
dC* 
(28)  C*  =,  dt+adwt 
t 
dW,* 
=W*  =  dt + a  dwt, 
where 7  = ft  p/y  +  ((y  -  1)/y)(o"2(y  + 
X)/2  + pl(l  y -  X)). 
Clearly, the expected wealth growth ftw  is 
increasing in X, as Op,wlOX  >  0. Using such a 
conventional-growth-model  framework,  we  are 
thus able to show that the stronger  the spirit  of 
capitalism  or the more the investor  cares about 
status,  the faster  the capital  stock (or wealth) will 
grow. This fonnally justifies the reasoning  by, 
among  others,  Weber  ( 1958) and  Keynes  ( 1971  ) 
that  the spirit  of capitalism  is the underlying  driv- 
ing force for fast economic growth. 
As an aside, note that by definition the elas- 
ticity  of  intertemporal substitution  in  con- 
sumption is given by the response of ftc  to a 
change in  the marginal product of  capital,7 
which means the elasticity coefficient here is 
just the reciprocal of  y,  as 0,f/Of4t  =  1/y. 
Since  RRA  =  y  +  X, we  conclude that in 
an economy  with  capitalistic  investors  the 
intertemporal-elasticity  and the risk-aversion 
coefficients are no longer reciprocal. 
B.  Model 2: Ratio of One's Own Wealth to 
Social Index Determines Status 
When making consumption-portfolio deci- 
sions, investors under Model 2 will  have to 
take into account what happens to the social- 
wealth index so that their relative status will 
not suddenly sink below  a certain level.  In 
Proposition 2, the optimal proportion  invested 
in the risky stock, a!*, precisely reflects this 
concern. The first term in (23),  ((,u-  ro)/ 
a 2)  (1  /(y  +  X)), is dictated by the investor's 
aversion to  wealth risk. In particular, since 
caring about status makes the investor more 
risk averse, he will hold less of the risky stock 
than someone who does not care about status 
(X=  0). 
The second term in (23),  (aia2)(X/(y  + 
X)), deserves more comments. This part  of the 
optimal holding depends critically on how the 
risky stock is correlated  with the social-wealth 
index Vt.  (i) Suppose a I, > 0, that  is, the stock 
is  positively  correlated with  the  index  Vt. 
Then, as discussed earlier, adding this stock to 
the portfolio will increase the correlation be- 
tween  W,* and  Vt, which  serves  to  insure 
against future uncertain declines in status that 
can result from rises  in  social-wealth  stan- 
dards. Consequently, the second term in (23) 
is positive and increasing in a,,,,  and the in- 
vestor puts a higher proportion  into the stock 
than dictated by risk aversion alone. The in- 
tensity of the investor's desire to insure against 
status falls is indicated by X/(y  +  X), which 
is increasing in X.  The more the investor cares 
about status,  the more of the risky stock he will 
hold for insurance  purposes.  (ii) Suppose a I, = 
0,  that is,  the stock is  uncorrelated with  Vt. 
Then, the risky asset is of no status-insurance 
vauie_  As a result the second term is zero and 
'See,  among others, George M. Constantinides  (1990) 
and Epstein and Zin (1991). It is discussed there  that  under 
the standard  expected utility the elasticity coefficient and 
the relative risk aversion are reciprocal of one another  and 
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the investor's holding is completely dictated 
by the investor's aversion to wealth risk. (iii) 
Finally, suppose al ,  < 0. In this case, holding 
too much of the stock will only work toward 
reducing the  investor's  status some  further 
when V, rises. To avoid such a "double pen- 
alty," the investor will hold less of the risky 
stock than determined  by risk aversion. 
For the same reason as given above, the pro- 
pensity to consume under Model 2, 7, has a 
mixed response to an increase in the extent to 
which the investor cares about status, that is, 
A9,q/O  can take either sign. The propensity to 
consume decreases as the expected growth  rate 
in the social-wealth index increases: 97IOr,y  < 
0. Intuitively, when V,  is expected to grow fas- 
ter, the investor will have to consume less in 
order to maintain a desired social status. An 
increase in the volatility of V,, a 2,  can lead to 
either a decrease or an increase in the propen- 
sity to consume, depending on whether A >  1 
or not. If the investor cares a lot about status 
in the sense that X >  1, an increase in 5  will 
lead to a lower q:  Oq /O2  <  0.  This is to say 
that savings rates will be high in an economy 
where investors care much about status and 
where the social-wealth standards grow fast 
and volatilely. 
The optimal-wealth  and consumption-growth 
dynamics  under  Model 2 are given below: 
dC*  dW* 
(29)  dC-  W 
C*  W* 
=A~t?, 
-  ro +  X1I,  v 
a(y  +  A) 
where 
y  _  1  Q)(X  yv_p  + 
I 
A(A-l  _))2) 
(y  +  1)(Ht  -  ro  +  Aal,v)2 
2U2Y(y  +  A) 
2,yXaj,v(j  -  ro  +  A.,j) 
2U2y(y  +  A) 
It is clear that expected wealth growth is in- 
creasing in ,uv  and, if A >  1, in the volatility 
uv, as  well.  Therefore, when  social-wealth 
standards grow fast, the desire to  "catch up 
with the Joneses" will make the capital stock 
also grow fast. Next, the impact of an increase 
in X on expected wealth growth will be deter- 
mined by the joint working of three effects: 
the portfolio effect, the savings effect, and the 
status-hedging  effect. As in Model 1, the more 
the investor cares about status,  the more averse 
to wealth risk (causing wealth to grow slower) 
and the higher the savings rate (causing wealth 
to grow faster).  But, unlike in Model 1, this 
also increases the investor's desire to insure 
against status declines, which means investing 
more in the risky stock (assuming the stock 
has a positive correlation  with Vt) and causing 
wealth to grow faster.  Depending on which 
effect dominates, a higher X can mean higher 
or lower expected wealth growth. However, as 
in  the previous subsection, if  we  adopt the 
common assumption from the growth litera- 
ture of  a sole investment asset, the portfolio 
and the hedging effects  due to caring about 
status will not matter and only the savings ef- 
fect will play a role. This is to say that in that 
case economic growth will be faster as inves- 
tors care more about status. 
C.  Model 3: Self-Perception 
Determines Happiness 
With the preferences of Model 3, the com- 
plexity of the consumption-portfolio problem 
rises significantly.8  For our purpose, assume V, 
grows at a deterministic rate: 
(30)  V  = ro  dt, 
Vt 
that is, set I,u,t =  ro  and u,,t =  0 in (11).  The 
wealth standard  grows at the risk-free rate. 
PROPOSITION 3.  Let the utility and the V, 
process  be  respectively as  given  in (5)  and 
(30).  Then, 
8 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman  equation in (46) is dif- 
ficult to solve in closed form even when, for example, V, 
follows  a geometric Brownian motion as in the last two 
subsections. The case which renders a closed-form solu- 
tion  obtainable  by  us  is  the  one  examined  in  this 
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(31)  C*  =  -(W*  KVt) 
(32)a  *  =  -r-o  t 
2  +A(  W*) 
(33 )  J(Wt, Vt) 
(_,, 
=  -  ~(Wt  -  KVt)  ,-' 
1-y-X 
where  y  1ro  +  + 
+ -7  X- 
2 y  +  XA  a 
:  ?0,  y  +  X 2  1. 
The above result has many intuitively ap- 
pealing implications. First, optimal consump- 
tion is proportional  to the difference between 
the investor's wealth and his subsistence ref- 
erence. The optimal proportion, (,  is strictly 
decreasing  and  convex  in  X: caring  about 
status  induces the investor to consume less, but 
the speed at which the investor lowers the op- 
timal proportion increases  as  the  extent  to 
which the investor cares about status  increases. 
Unlike in Models  1 and 2, the propensity to 
consume here depends on the investor's rela- 
tive status: 
(34)  7-  1 -  KQ  i)  0, 
which means that (i)  the higher the poverty- 
aversion coefficient (K),  the lower the propen- 
sity to consume; (ii)  the higher the investor's 
relative social status as measured by W,*/Vt, 
the higher the propensity to consume; and (iii) 
7rr  is increasing in wealth W* but decreasing 
in social-wealth index Vt. Therefore, in a so- 
ciety where status is crucial and where mem- 
bers compete to get into the upper-wealth  class 
(by  setting high K values),  the propensity to 
consume will be relatively low and the savings 
rate will be relatively high. Since W* follows 
a diffusion process, so will irt. 
Second, based on (33),  the implied relative 
risk aversion is 
W* 
(35)  RRA = (y  + X)  >t0,O 
which is increasing in  y, X, K  and Vt but de- 
creasing in W*. In words, an investor will be- 
come more averse to wealth risk as (i)  the in- 
vestor cares more about status;  (ii) he becomes 
more averse to poverty; (iii)  the social-wealth 
standard  goes higher; (iv) the investor's wealth 
goes lower; and (v)  the investor's social status 
declines. Thus, including status in the prefer- 
ences allows us to relate  an investor's  risk aver- 
sion to both his relative standing  in the wealth 
distribution  and the degree  to which the investor 
can handle  poverty. 
Third, since the wealth index Vt follows  a 
deterministic  process, there is no social-wealth 
uncertainty to  hedge  against. Consequently, 
the optimal proportion of savings invested in 
the risky stock is entirely determined by the 
investor's relative risk aversion, RRA, and the 
market  price of risk. As before, higher relative 
risk aversion means lower investment in the 
risky stock. The comparative  statics of a * with 
respect  to X,  K,  Vt, W*,  and  W*/Vt are  exactly 
the opposite of those of RRA with respect to 
the respective parameters and variables (see 
the paragraph  above). 
Next,  the growth process of  wealth is  as 
follows: 
dW* 
(36)  W* = liw,t  at 
1  -  rO  W* -  KVt 
y +  t  d 
where 
(  (y  + Ol)t  -  r) 
(37)  Iw,t  rO  +  2y(y  +  X)o2 
y  -1  p(y  -) 
-  rO 
y(y  + AX-1) 
W*  -KV  x 
Wt* 
As in Model 1, caring about status may mean 
lower or higher expected wealth growth (i.e., 
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whether its portfolio effect dominates its sav- 
ings effect. 
Unlike in Models  1 and 2,  however,  ex- 
pected wealth growth p,u,  is decreasing in the 
poverty-aversion coefficient K and the social- 
wealth level V,.9  Note that even though an in- 
crease in  K  or V, will  lead to  a decrease in 
consumption  and hence an increase in savings, 
it will also imply an increase in risk aversion 
and thus a decrease in risky investment. The 
latter results in a decline in expected wealth 
growth. Here, the  risk-aversion effect  of  a 
higher K  or V, dominates the savings effect, 
making its overall impact on wealth growth 
negative. Higher wealth, on the other hand, 
means higher expected wealth growth. To see 
this, an increase in W* causes the investor both 
to consume more (and thus save less)  and to 
be less risk averse. But, in this case, the posi- 
tive effect (on risk taking) dominates the neg- 
ative effect (on savings ), rendering  the overall 
impact on wealth growth positive. 
Finally, the growth process for consumption 
is no longer the same as that for wealth: 
dC*  1  L  u-ro 
(38)  dc*  =  dt +  +  wdw,, 
where  ,uc,,  (ro/y  -  p(y  -  1)/y(y  +  A  - 
1) +  (y  +  l)(,t  -  ro)2/2y(y  +  X)o2).  'While 
the optimal consumption level is decreasing in 
K  and  increasing  in  W*/Vt,  consumption 
growth is  independent of  these two  factors. 
Note that in this economy both the return  pro- 
cess on the risky stock and the consumption- 
growth  process  are  independently - and- 
identically-distributed  random walks, whereas 
the growth process for wealth has both its drift 
and diffusion terms state and time dependent. 
In this sense, Model 3 not only offers many 
empirically plausible features but also leads to 
richer economic dynamics. 
III. Empirical  Tests 
Like  the  standard expected-utility theory, 
models of preferences that take into account 
concerns about relative status are ultimately 
judged on how well they fare empirically. Fol- 
lowing  standard practice, one  can test  such 
preference models by examining the empirical 
validity of their implied Euler equations. That 
is,  we  can  achieve  this goal  by  testing the 
discrete-time Euler  equation in  (9)  or  the 
continuous-time  pricing  equation  in  (12). 
Since all economic data is collected at discrete 
time intervals, we chose to focus efforts on the 
Euler equation in (9). 
Applying the preferences of Models 2 and 
3 to (9),  one obtains two parametrized ver- 
sions of the Euler equation and both are test- 
able-so  long  as  all  required data can  be 
collected.  In  addition to  stock  prices,  one 
needs data on  consumption, wealth and the 
social-wealth index in order to  test the two 
models. Whereas proxies for consumption and 
wealth, at either the individual or aggregate 
level, are available at some sacrifice of quality, 
the choice of proxies for the social-wealth in- 
dex is not apparent.  At the aggregate level, it's 
not clear what the social-wealth reference for 
the "representative investor" corresponds to 
in reality, not to mention collecting such data. 
By  definition, the  "representative investor" 
will always be exactly in the middle class: S, = 
W,/W, =  1, if we use per-capita wealth as the 
wealth standard,  where a bar indicates it's the 
per-capita counterpart  of the variable. Under 
Model 2, for instance, this effectively  means 
that even  if  individual investors care about 
status, the representative  investor will not, be- 
cause no matter what this so-defined investor 
does  he  cannot get  out of  the middle-class 
status. As such, even though we showed that 
aggregation does  obtain for Model  2  under 
certain conditions, it may not make sense to 
test Model 2 using aggregate data because the 
very feature of caring about status will not be 
present in the Euler equation for the represen- 
tative investor. In the case of Model 3, it is 
probably even  less  justified  to  subject  the 
9  This statement  relies on the fact that 
t(y 
+  1)(M 
-  rof  y  7-I10  _( 
(-  1)  A o:-0 
2y(y  + X)U2  y  ?  y(y  +  AX-1) 
To see why this expression in (37) must be nonnegative, 
suppose, to the contrary,  that it were negative. Then, W,* 
would be expected to grow at a rate, A,,,, lower than the 
risk-free rate ro at which KV, grows. This means (W,* - 
KV,) would become negative in the long run, which con- 
tradicts  the restriction  that (W,*  -  KV,) >  0 at each t. 146  THE AMERICAN  ECONOMIC  REVIEW  MARCH 1996 
corresponding  Euler equation  to aggregate  data 
because in that case aggregation may not ob- 
tain even  under the assumption of  identical 
preferences across investors. For this reason, 
it may make more sense to subject the Euler 
equations for Models  2  and 3  to individual 
consumer data. But, as discussed before, two 
consumers who are in two distinct reference 
groups will  have two different social-wealth 
indices  to  which  they  compare themselves. 
This means that possibly for each individual a 
social-wealth  index  may  have  to  be  con- 
structed  and collected, in order  to have the two 
models tested on cross-sectional  consumer  data. 
To maintain  the scope of this paper, we leave 
such an investigation  for a follow-up project. 
We are thus led to focus on Model 1 as this 
preference  model is independent  of any social- 
wealth index and yet captures  an important  part 
of investors' desire to improve relative social 
standing.  Alternatively,  if we assume  that  wealth 
standards  stayed  unchanged  in the United States 
during the sample period 1959-1991,  we can 
interpret  our tests of Model 1 as tests of Model 
2 because the latter  in that  case collapses to the 
former.  In any case, as shown earlier,  aggrega- 
tion obtains under Model  1 if  we  adopt the 
assumption  of identical preferences across in- 
vestors. This means that under  this assumption 
it is justified to subject the Euler equation for 
Model 1 to aggregate  data. The Euler equation 
below is used for the empirical  tests to follow: 
(39)  Efmt+  Ri,t+ lZtl  =  1, 
which is obtained  by substituting  the utility  func- 
tion of Model 1 into (9)  and setting /\t  =  1, 
where:  e  -  eP,  Rit  + I  is the gross  return  on asset 
i, Zt the time t information  set with respect to 
which the conditional  expectation  is taken, and 
(40)-  mt++  I-6R7+  I  R+l 
(  -  I  W,+  I)' 
letting Rc  t+  I  Ct+  I/Ct  and Rwt+  I  Wt+  I/ 
Wt.  Note that  when X = 0,-  this IMRS collapses 
to  that  implied  by  the  standard constant- 
relative-risk-aversion (CRRA)  power utility. 
The IMRS in Epstein and Zin (1991  eq. 20) 
can, following our notation, be expressed as 
\  ' s  /  ''V~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t+  t-''t  l''W,tt + 
which  is  clearly different from the m,  +1  in 
(40).  Indeed, using discrete-time  data,  one can 
distinguish our Model  1 from their parame- 
trized model. 
To identify the IMRS in empirical tests, we 
need three time series: {  Rc }, {  Rw }, and { Ct/ 
Wt  }. Following standard  practice, we choose 
the real-growth series for per-capita nondura- 
bles and services consumption as a proxy for 
Rc,t.  The proxy choice of Rw,t  is nontrivial. As 
Richard W.  Roll  (1977)  argues, aggregate 
wealth or the market portfolio is almost im- 
possible to estimate because a major portion 
of it is not traded and hence its value is not 
observable. For this reason, researchers often 
have to look for some observable proxy. Fol- 
lowing Cochrane and Hahsen ( 1992 ), Epstein 
and Zin (1991),  and Robert E. Hall (1978), 
we  use  the return on  the New  York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE)  value-weighted index  as 
a  stand-in  for  RW  t.  The  time  series  for 
consumption-to-wealth  ratio, { Ct/Wt  }, is con- 
structed as follows.  Note that Ct =  Co  ITt=  1 
RC,T  and Wt  =  Wo  FIt=  1 RWT  which gives 
Ct  = Co  t 
RC,T 
wt  WO T  RW,T 
Given that we have chosen the real-life coun- 
terparts  for Rc,t  and  Rw , we only need the start- 
ing value, C0/WO,  in order  to construct  the time 
series for Ct/Wt.  The starting  value, C0/WO,  is 
chosen via a calibration  exercise such that the 
mean of the resulting time series for Ct/Wt  is 
consistent with what has been reported in the 
literature.  This criterion has lead to a monthly 
initial value of  C0/WO  =  0.0076  (i.e.,  for the 
first month of 1959),  which corresponds  to an 
annualized initial consumption-to-wealth  ratio 
of 9.12 percent. The mean of the resulting time 
series for  Ct/Wt  is  an annualized 6.83  per- 
cent.10  Since the estimate for 6 was close  to 
'  Lawrence Christiano (1991),  for example, reports 
that the average consumption-to-GNP  ratio (per capita) is 
about 0.73, while the average capital stock-to-GNP ratio 
is  about  10.59.  The  implied  average consumption-to- 
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one in all pre-tried estimations, we set 6  =  1 
in all reported tests so that there is one less 
parameter  to estimate. 
The data set used, a detailed description of 
which is in Appendix B, contains monthly ob- 
servations on  stock  and bond  returns, per- 
capita consumption, and returns  on the NYSE 
value-weighted index. Monthly data has been 
used in numerous empirical studies of  asset 
pricing including, among others, Epstein and 
Zin (1991),  Wayne Ferson and George M. 
Constantinides  (1991), Hansen  and Jagannathan 
(1991,  1994),  and Hansen  and  Singleton 
(1982). 
To aid the discussion to follow, recall that 
according to the spirit-of-capitalism  hypothe- 
sis, the preference parameters  should be such 
that  X >  0 when y  2  1 and X <  0 when y  < 
1. If  this hypothesis is  empirically true, we 
should  expect  the  resulting  asset-pricing 
model to perform  better when the values of y 
and X are consistent with this restriction. 
A.  Hansen-Jagannathan Bound Diagnostics 
We first apply the Hansen and Jagannathan 
(1991)  diagnostic method to check whether 
the  IMRS  in  (40)  satisfies  the  volatility 
bounds for any admissible IMRS or stochastic 
discount factor.  Let  R  be  the N  vector of 
payoffs to the N assets included in the inves- 
tigation, q the N vector of prices for the pay- 
offs, and ER the covariance matrix of R. Then, 
if our asset-pricing model in (39)  can empir- 
ically  explain  the  pricing  structure for  the 
N  assets,  it  is,  according  to  Hansen  and 
Jagannathan  (eq. 12  ), necessary that its IMRS 
in (40)  satisfy 
(42)  am  UR 
([E(q)  -  AmE(R)  ] '  R 
X  [ E(q)-  mE(R)  -1/2 
where urn  and  Cm  are, respectively, the uncon- 
ditional mean and standard deviation of  the 
proposed IMRS. For any given value of um, 
the volatility  bound is  constructed by  esti- 
mating the mean vector E(R)  and the matrix 
ER-  We  refer  the  reader  to  Hansen  and 
Jagannathan ( 1991 )  for  detailed  derivation 
and interpretation  of this diagnostic. 
As for the choice of assets in R, Hansen and 
Jagannathan  ( 1991 ) suggest that including re- 
turns generated by using conditioning infor- 
mation should sharpen the volatility bounds 
considerably. Guided by their suggestion, we 
include in R: (i)  real returns respectively on 
the NYSE value-weighted index and on long- 
term government  bonds and (ii)  scaled returns 
constructed via multiplying each of these two 
assets, separately, by their lagged returns and 
the lagged real return  on the smallest decile of 
NYSE  stocks. Thus, R contains a total of  8 
assets (2 primitive and 6 scaled).  The result- 
ing Hansen-Jagannathan  bounds are shown as 
the  0-curve  in  Figure  1.  The  O  -curve  in 
Figure 1 indicates the (lm,  ,m)  pairs obtained 
via  fixing  the  value  of  y  and varying  the 
value of X, and the A-curve by fixing X and 
varying y. 
For certain { y, X} values, the resulting  (Im 
am)  pairs for the IMRS are inside the Hansen- 
Jagannathan  acceptance region. For instance, 
the Hansen-Jagannathan  bounds are not vio- 
lated when y  is fixed at 4.50  and X is in the 
range 4.08-4.58,  or when X is fixed at 4.50 
and y is in the range 5.50-8.50.  In these cases, 
the implied relative risk aversion in wealth, 
RRA =  y  +  X, is around 9. This is in sharp 
contrast  with  the  finding  of  Hansen  and 
Jagannathan  ( 1991 ) that the relative risk aver- 
sion needs to be in excess of 100 in order for 
the standard  expected-utility model to satisfy 
the volatility bounds. 
Observe that the A-curve (corresponding to 
a fixed value for X) is virtually flat, whereas 
the  0-curve  (corresponding to a fixed value 
for y) is not. This is the case because, with the 
consumption  growth  series  being  smooth, 
varying the value of y by a small value will 
mostly change the mean, but not the standard 
deviation, of  the IMRS. On the other hand, 
given the volatility of wealth growth, changing 
the value of X even by a small amount  can lead 
to a large change in the volatility of the IMRS. 
roughly the same as the annualized mean of our monthly 
time series for C,IW,  as constructed  above. Also see Camp- 
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Therefore,  the ability of our model to generate 
a volatile IMRS comes mostly from the impact 
of the spirit of capitalism. 
Stephen G. Cecchetti et  al.  (1994)  argue 
that the original Hansen-Jagannathan  bound 
diagnostic is not a statistical test as it involves 
comparing the point estimates of the volatility 
bound with those of the standard  deviation of 
the IMRS. To take into account sampling er- 
rors, we follow their procedure  to test whether 
am 2:  URfor  a given value of  Um and whether 
am  lies  within two  standard errors from the 
Hansen-Jagannathan  bounds.11 Table  1 pre- 
sents the results of  such an investigation for 
several values of X and y. The reported t sta- 
tistic tests the one-sided null hypothesis that 
gm  -  U  0.  As in Cecchetti et al., the stan- 
dard errors for this t test are calculated using 
the method in Whitney K. Newey and Kenneth 
D. West ( 1987a) with 11 lags (the results were 
quantitatively  similar when alternate  numbers 
of lags, such as 6, 9, or 15, were employed). 
The appropriate  critical values for this test sta- 
tistic are -1.65  and -2.33  for the 5- and 1- 
percent significance levels, respectively. That 
is, an absolute t value below 1.65 means a re- 
jection of the null at the 5-percent significance 
level,  and an absolute t value below  2.33  a 
rejection at the 1-percent  level. 
Start  with the IMRS implied by the standard 
CRRA expected utility, which corresponds to 
our IMRS with X =  0. Table 1 indicates that 
the standard  IMRS is not volatile enough even 
for large values of  y, and the t values for the 
null that am  -CR 
-  0 are much higher in ab- 
solute  value  than  the  critical  value,  1.65. 
Therefore, the standard  model fails to satisfy 
the volatility bounds even when sampling er- 
rors are taken into consideration. 
In contrast,  when X >  0, the results are sub- 
stantially different. For instance, let  X =  2. 
Then, the resulting IMRS is volatile and the 
null hypothesis that am  -  CR  is  rejected at the 
5-percent significance level when y is between 
4.0  and 6.0. This implies that with sampling 
0a 
0.96  0  0 
0  IJ  Bounds  0 
a 
0  0 
0.80  0 
0  a 
a  a  o  0  0 
Ca  0  a 
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0  0 
E  0  O 
C  0.48  0  0 
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y8  .00  a  -y4.50 
0.32  8  X=4.4.5a  8  X.Y-5.50 0  0 
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FIGURE  1. HANSEN-JAGANNATHAN  VOLATILITY  BOUNDS 
Note: The Hansen-Jagannathan  bounds are illustrated by 
the El-curve.  The candidate IMRS is given by 
mt](C  )  WI )  -  I W,+  , 
The O  -curve stands for the mean-standard  deviation pairs 
of the IMRS obtained by fixing /3 =  1, y  =  4.50,  and 
varying X.  The A-curve stands for the mean and standard 
deviation pairs of the IMRS obtained  by fixing ,B  =  1, X  = 
4.50, and varying y. 
errors taken into consideration, the Hansen- 
Jagannathan  bounds are not violated when the 
relative risk aversion varies between 6 and 8. 
Similar conclusions emerge when X = 4.0 and 
y varies between 3 and 15, with the implied 
relative risk aversion between 7 and 19. 
Also note that when y <  1 and X >  0 (i.e., 
the first three rows in Table 1), the parameter 
restriction implied by the spirit-of-capitalism 
hypothesis is violated. In these cases, the vol- 
atility bounds are overwhelmingly violated as 
well. Together  with the other  results  in Table 1, 
this suggests that parameter  values consistent 
with the spirit-of-capitalism  hypothesis lead to 
better-performing  IMRS models. 
The  above  Hansen-Jagannathan bound- 
based results are robust to  the inclusion  of 
other assets in R. In most cases, values for the 
" See Cecchetti et al. (1994) for details regarding the 
test method and technical results on the asymptotic-distri- 
bution theory. Also  see Hansen et al. (1995).  We thank 
Nelson Mark for providing us with his code for their test 
procedure. VOL. 86 NO. I  BAKSHI  AND CHEN: SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM  149 
TABLE  1-CECCHETTI-LAM-MARK  VOLATILITY  BOUND  TESTS 
X=0  X=2  X=4 
y  (Tn  UR  t value  (Tn  UR  t value  (Tn  UR  t value 
0  0.000  0.224  -4.10  0.091  0.488  -2.71  0.192  0.744  -3.71 
0.50  0.002  0.206  -3.78  0.091  0.912  -4.99  0.187  1.591  -3.85 
0.75  0.003  0.200  -3.65  0.088  1.743  -7.98  0.178  3.265  -7.20 
2  0.007  0.183  -3.25  0.095  0.319  -1.91  0.203  0.855  -1.90 
3  0.011  0.189  -3.30  0.095  0.183  -1.69  0.201  0.409  -0.68 
4  0.016  0.210  -3.52  0.096  0.220  -1.14  0.200  0.253  -0.22 
5  0.019  0.024  -3.74  0.097  0.278  -1.32  0.200  0.190  -0.11 
6  0.023  0.028  -3.91  0.098  0.338  -1.56  0.201  0.187  -0.13 
7  0.027  0.032  -4.05  0.099  0.395  -1.79  0.201  0.218  -0.07 
8  0.031  0.037  -4.14  0.100  0.450  -2.01  0.202  0.263  -0.21 
9  0.034  0.417  -4.22  0.102  0.504  -2.20  0.203  0.312  -0.34 
10  0.038  0.465  -4.29  0.104  0.556  -2.38  0.214  0.363  -0.47 
15  0.057  0.704  -4.48  0.114  0.806  -3.02  0.209  0.609  -1.01 
Notes: The volatility bound tests reported  here are based upon Cecchetti et al. (1994). The IMRS being tested is 
M  (  )(  1 
The asset vector used includes eight assets: RVWI,, RLTGB,, RVWI,  *  RVWI1,_  , RVWI,  -  RLTGB,_  1, RLTGB,  *  RVWl_ I, 
RLTGB,  *  RLTGB,_  I, RVWI,  *  RDEC ,  ,_ , RLTGB,  *  RDEC ,,  ,I,  where RVWI, RLTGB, and RDEC  1  denote, respectively, 
the real returns  on the NYSE value-weighted index, long-term government bonds and the lowest decile of NYSE stocks. 
The asymptotic standard  errors  are based on Cecchetti et al. (eq. 19) and a lag length of 11 is used in the computation  of 
the Newey-West (1987a) covariance matrix. For each estimation, set ,6 =  1. The reported  t value tests the null hypothesis 
that um  -UR  ?  0, where um and UR are, respectively, the standard  deviation of the IMRS and the volatility bound. The 
critical t value, above which the null is rejected, is -1.65  at the 5-percent and -2.33  at the 1-percent significance level. 
preference parameters  that support  the volatil- 
ity  bounds are similar to  those  reported in 
Table 1. 
B.  Hansen-Jagannathan Specification 
Error Tests 
Hansen  and Jagannathan (1994)  propose 
the following  distance measure to reflect the 
performance  of an asset-pricing  model in pric- 
ing the assets in R: 
(43 j  6 =  (E(q) -  E(mR) )  [E(RR'  )  - 
X (E(q)-E(mR))]12, 
where all variables are as defined before and 
m is the IMRS implied by the pricing model. 
They show that this 6 measures the minimum 
distance between the candidate m and the set 
of  admissible stochastic discount factors. It 
can also be interpreted  as measuring the max- 
imum pricing error  induced by the IMRS over 
the unit ball in the payoff span of R.  A nice 
property of  this measure is that if  two-asset 
pricing models lead to two different 6 values, 
we can say the one with the smaller 6 performs 
better than the other in pricing the assets in R. 
An admissible pricing model is one whose 6 
value  is  zero.  For  further discussion,  see 
Hansen and Jagannathan. 
Using the same set of assets from Subsec- 
tion A, we report  in Table 2 specification error 
estimates for the IMRS in (40).  The standard 
errors are calculated with the help of Propo- 
sition 3.2 in Hansen et al. ( 1995 ) and by using 
11 lags in the Newey-West (1987a)  correction 
procedure. Again, the case with X =  0 corre- 
sponds to the standard  time-separable model. 
In Table 2, 6 values for the standard  model are 
between 0.180 to 0.184. When X >  0, the im- 
plied IMRS typically leads to lower 6 values. 
For example, when X varies between 0.5 and 
2.0, the value of 6 corresponding  to any given 
y is consistently smaller than when X = 0. The 
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TABLE  2-HANSEN-JAGANNATHAN  SPECIFICATION ERROR  TESTS 
y  A = 0  A = 0.50  A =  1.00  X =  1.50  A = 2.00  X =  2.50 
0.50  0.184  0.180  0.178  0.178  0.181  0.186 
(0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
2  0.183  0.179  0.177  0.177  0.180  0.184 
(0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.052) 
5  0.183  0.179  0.177  0.177  0.179  0.184 
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.051) 
10  0.181  0.178  0.176  0.177  0.179  0.184 
(0.050)'  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.05 1) 
15  0.181  0.177  0.176  0.177  0.180  0.184 
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.051) 
20  0.180  0.177  0.176  0.177  0.180  0.185 
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.05 1) 
25  0.180  0.177  0.177  0.178  0.181  0.186 
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.05 1) 
30  0.180  0.177  0.177  0.178  0.182  0.187 
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.051) 
Minimum'5 =  0.176 obtained at y =  6.40 and X  =  1.07 
Constrained  minimum 6 = 0.180 obtained at y  =  29.44 and X fixed at 0 
Notes: Estimation of the specification error,  6, is based on Hansen and Jagannathan  (1994 eq. 2.10). The standard  errors, 
reported  in parentheses,  are estimated following Hansen et al. (1995 Proposition 3.2). A lag length of 11 is employed for 
the Newey-West (1987a) correction. The payoff vector used includes eight assets: RVWI,, RLTGB,, RVWI,  -RVWI,1-, 
RVWI,RLTGB,-,,  RLTGB,-RVWI,,  RLTGB,RLTGB,1,  RVWI,-RDEC,1, IRLTGB,-RDEC  ,,,  where RVWI, 
RLTGB, and RDEC, denote, respectively, the real returns on the NYSE value-weighted index, long-term government 
bonds and the lowest decile of NYSE stocks. For each estimation, set ,  =  1. The reported minimum 6 is obtained by 
choosing y and X, in the unconstrained  case, and y, in the constrained case, to minimize the Hansen-Jagannathan  spec- 
ification error. 
6 values obtained, respectively, by the choice 
of both y and A  and by the choice of y subject 
to the constraint A =  0. The constrained min- 
imum 6 is 0.180, with the estimated y at 29.44, 
whereas  its  unconstrained  counterpart  is 
0.176,  with the estimated y  at 6.40  and A at 
1.07. Thus, when concerns about status are re- 
flected  in  preferences,  the  resulting  asset- 
pricing model generates smaller pricing errors. 
We  can also  use  the Hansen-Jagannathan 
specification error measure to  compare the 
performance of our IMRS, m+ 1, versus that 
of Epstein and Zin's (199.1) IMRS, m+ 1, as 
given  in  (41).  Recall  that in  the  case  of 
Epstein and Zin, the parameter  restriction is 
that y  > Oif X<  1; y  <  Oif X>  1; andy  = 
0 if N.  =  1. Under the spirit-of-capitalism  hy- 
pothesis,  however, it  should be  that A >  0 
when y  2  1 and X <  0 when y  <  1. As the 
first example, fix X =  1.07. Then, in the case 
of Epstein and Zin, the minimum 8 among all 
t+ l  corresponding to the permissible range 
for  y (i.e.,  y  <  0)  is 0.178,  whereas in our 
case the minimum 8 obtainable at X =  1.07 is 
0.176,  with y  =  6.40  (see  Table 2).  As an- 
other example, fix X =  2.0. The minimum 6 
within the permissible y  value range for the 
Epstein-Zin model is 0.180, While  that for our 
Model  1  within  y  values  consistent  with 
the  spirit-of-capitalism hypothesis  is  0.179. 
Therefore, taking the  parameter restrictions 
into account, our Model 1 does slightly better 
than Epstein and Zin's. The parameter  range, 
(y  ?2  1,  1 2  A  2  0 ),  is consistent with both 
our hypothesis and their model. Within this 
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pricing errors and perform equally well  (for 
this  reason, the  corresponding specification 
error values  for  m "+I are  not  reported in 
Table 2). 
C.  Criterion-Based  Inferences and GMM 
Tests of the Euler Equation 
The purpose of this subsection is to apply 
Hansen's (1982)  generalized method of mo- 
ments (GMM)  to test the Euler equation in 
(39).  To briefly explain the implementation, 
suppose the ith portfolio is included in the test 
and define the disturbance: 
=i+  f3R  7IR  +(1  ?  yx  Ct+I)  +-p  C,t  + lWyt  1 W I+) 
X  Ri,t + I-  1. 
Stack  all ei,t + I into  the vector  et + I. Under  the 
null that the model holds, we have E( et+  i+  0 
Zt)  =  0, that is, the disturbance must be or- 
thogonal to the information variables in  Zt. 
Each GMM estimation is based on minimizing 
the quadratic  form, GTfTGT,  where T is the 
number of monthly observations, GT  the sam- 
ple analog of the process {  et + I 0  Zt }, and QT 
a positive-definite, symmetric-weighting ma- 
trix. The  minimized value  of  the  quadratic 
form multiplied by T, called the JT  statistic, is 
x2 distributed  under the null that the model is 
true, with degrees of freedom, df, equal to the 
number of orthogonality conditions net of the 
number  of parameters  to be estimated. The JT 
statistic  provides a goodness-of-fit measure  for 
the model: a higher value means a more mis- 
specified model. 
The choice of information  instruments  in Zt 
is an important  one and in this regard theory 
has  little  guidance  (Hansen  and  Singleton, 
1982). Based on previous research, Zt is cho- 
sen to contain a constant and two lags each of 
the default premium, the term premium, and 
the  nominal  returns on  the  NYSE  value- 
weighted index (except that when more than 
one portfolio is included in the test, only one 
lag of each instrument is used so as to keep 
the number of moment conditions at a proper 
level, i.e., 8).  To check robustness, we exper- 
imented with alternate  sets of instruments  and 
found that the results do  not  differ signifi- 
cantly. To save space, we concentrate on the 
said set of instruments. 
Table 3 reports  results from estimations us- 
ing  a broad set  of  portfolios. For instance, 
estimates of  Iy, A} in  the  first three rows 
are obtained each by including a size-based 
portfolio, RDECI, RDEC5, or RDEC o. The 
standard  errors  reported  in parenthesis  are cal- 
culated using  the  simple  covariance matrix 
outlined in Hansen (1982).  The p  value in 
brackets tests the null that the estimated pa- 
rameter  equals zero. The p value reported  be- 
low  the  JT statistic indicates the probability 
that a x2 variate exceeds the minimized sam- 
ple value of the GMM criterion function. 
Start  with results from estimations in which 
X  and y are unrestricted.  When only one port- 
folio is included, the estimated range for y is 
2.27-3.08.  Note  that  the  magnitude  of  y 
tends to decrease with firm size. For instance, 
the point estimate of  y  is  3.08  in  the case 
of  decile  1, while  in the cases  of  deciles  5 
and 10 the estimates are 2.67  and 2.27,  re- 
spectively.  This  is  consistent  with  the  fact 
that small stocks are generally more volatile 
than large ones. When more than one asset is 
included the test, the value of  y  varies be- 
tween 2.29-2.38.  In all cases, the estimated 
value for y is more than two standard errors 
away from zero and the p value is less than 5 
percent. 
The point estimates for X are in the range 
0.75-  1.27, and in all cases they are many stan- 
dard errors  away from zero, with the lowest p 
value being 0 percent.  For example, when dec- 
ile 10 and a portfolio of long-term government 
bonds are included in the test, the estimate for 
X is 0.75, with a standard  error of 0.08 and a 
p value of 0.00. Note that the point estimates 
for y  are uniformly greater than 1 and those 
for X uniformly positive, which is consistent 
with the restriction implied by the spirit-of- 
capitalism hypothesis. Together the implied 
relative risk aversion in wealth, y  +  X, is in 
the range 3.04-4.24,  which is in line with the 
estimates  of  Irvin Friend  and  Marshall E. 
Blume (1975),  who report relative risk aver- 
sion coefficients higher than 2.0. 
In  two  out  of  the  three  single-portfolio 
cases,  the  overidentifying  restrictions  im- 
posed by the model  are not rejected, as in- 
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TABLE  3-GMM  TESTS  OF THE EULER  EQUATION 
Unrestricted  A & y  Restricted  Restricted 
A  0  zy  =0 
Assets  X  A  J7U  7  J7  A  7 
RDEC,  3.08  1.16  22.71  5.44  8.51  0.90  3.76 
(0.91)  (0.34)  [0.00]  (1.60)  [0.00]  (0.22)  [0.05] 
[0.00]  [0.00]  {5}  [0.00]  [0.00] 
RDECs  2.67  1.27  7.05  4.50  44.18  0.89  12.80 
(0.37)  (0.18)  [0.22]  (0.87)  [0.00]  (0.11)  [0.00] 
[0.00]  [0.00]  {5}  [0.00]  [0.00] 
RDECIo  2.27  0.84  10.90  3.38  150.20  0.60  18.41 
(0.13)  (0.07)  [0.06]  (0.32)  [0.00]  (0.06)  [0.00] 
[0.00]  [0.00]  {5}  [0.00]  [0.00] 
RDECs & RDEC,o  2.38  0.82  17.51  4.22  100.81  0.58  18.87 
(0.15)  (0.07)  [0.00]  (0.34)  [0.00]  (0.04)  [0.00] 
[0.00]  [0.00]  {6}  [0.00]  [0.00] 
RDECIo  & RLTGB  2.29  0.75  13.21  3.44  85.08  0.55  18.47 
(0.15)  (0.08)  [0.04]  (0.37)  [0.00]  (0.04)  [0.00] 
[0.00]  [0.00]  {6}  [0.00] 
Notes: Estimation of the following Euler equation is based on Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments, 
E  (  C, )  WI+  I  (1  C1+  I 
R,t+  II  Zt}  =  1, 
where Zt  contains a constant and two lags (one lag when two assets are included in the test) each of term premium,  default 
premium and the nominal returns of the NYSE value-weighted index. The standard  errors reported in parentheses are 
based on the simple covariance-matrix  estimator as outlined in Hansen. The p value in brackets indicates the probability 
that the estimated parameter  equals zero. The degree of freedom df (reported  in curly brackets) is the number  of moment 
conditions minus the number of parameters to be estimated. The J7  statistic, J7-,u tests whether the overidentifying 
restrictions  of the model are true with the degrees of freedom, df. The statistic,  J7  =  J7;R  -  J7;u, is X2(1)-distributed,  with 
J7R  being the GMM criterion function value from the restricted  estimation. For each estimation, set P  =  1. RDEC, is the 
real return  on the ith decile of NYSE stocks and RLTGB the real return  on a portfolio of long-term government bonds. 
(if  we  use  the  5-percent  acceptance  crite- 
rion)."2  In the two  cases  that involve  more 
than one portfolio, the p values below the JT 
statistic  are smaller  than 5  percent,  which 
means the overidentifying restrictions are re- 
jected  by the data. In Euler equation-based 
tests of the standard consumption-based as- 
set  pricing  theory,  rejections  of  the  over- 
identifying  restrictions  are not  uncommon 
(e.g.,  Hansen et al., 1994 and the references 
therein). Thus, some rejections of the model 
in (39)  based on the GMM criterion function 
should not come as a surprise. 
Since the standard  CRRA model is nested 
within our model,  GMM criterion function- 
based  inferences  can  be  conducted  (e.g., 
Martin  Eichenbaum  et al., 1988; Hansen et al., 
1994; and Newey  and West,  1987b).  First, 
keep  the  weighting  matrix from  the  unre- 
stricted GMM  estimation; second,  use  this 
weighting matrix in the restricted GMM esti- 
mation by assuming X =  0 or y  =  0; then, 
compare the minimized GMM-criterion  value 
(multiplied by T) from the restricted estima- 
12 The above estimation results are robust to a change 
in the measure of aggregate consumption. For example, 
we reestimated the parameters  in the Euler equation, sep- 
arately using seasonally-adjusted nondurables consump- 
tion and services consumption. But, that did not lead to 
any qualitatively different results. The estimates for y and 
X are also similar in both magnitude and statistical signif- 
icance,  for  the  two  subperiods:  1959:1-1974:12  and 
1975:1-1991:12.  Thus,  our  conclusion  regarding the 
goodness-of-fit  of  the  model  as  well  as  the  spirit-of- 
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tion, denoted by  JT,R,  to that from the unre- 
stricted, denoted by JT,U: 
JT  =  JT,R  -  JT,U. 
This test statistic,  JT,  is asymptotically X2-dis- 
tributed  with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number  of exclusion restrictions.  Results from 
this exercise of imposing either X =  0 or y  = 
0  are  reported in  columns  marked  "Re- 
stricted"  in Table 3. With either  restriction,  X = 
0 or y  =  0, the GMM-criterion  function value 
increases substantially. In the case of X =  0, 
for example, when the long-term government 
bond portfolio and decile  10 are included in 
this likelihood-ratio test, the estimate of y  is 
3.44 and the JT statistic equals 85.08 with a p 
value of 0 percent.  The hypothesis that  restrict- 
ing the value of X  to zero does not change the 
GMM-criterion  value is therefore overwhelm- 
ingly  rejected. The  same  conclusion  holds 
when y is restricted to zero. 
In summary, results from the GMM tests 
are consistent with those  from the Hansen- 
Jagannathan  bound  and  the Hansen-Jagannathan 
specification  error-tests  reported  earlier,  all sup- 
porting  the claim that  incorporating  the spirit  of 
capitalism,  or concerns  about  status,  into the in- 
vestor's preferences  improves the ability of the 
asset-pricing  model to explain both stock and 
bond price movements. The magnitudes and 
signs of the estimated  y and X are supportive  of 
the spirit-of-capitalism  hypothesis. 
IV. Concluding  Remarks 
In this paper, we examined the implications 
for consumption, portfolio choice,  and stock 
prices, of the hypothesis that investors acquire 
wealth not just for its implied consumption  but 
also for its induced status. We formalized the 
spirit-of-capitalism  hypothesis in a way that is 
compatible  with the more formal models of as- 
set pricing that have been the prevailing mode 
of  analysis in the past two  decades. Among 
other  things, we found that  when investors care 
about status and about "catching up with the 
Joneses,"  they will  be more conservative in 
risk taking and more frugal in  consumption 
spending. Their consumption and risk taking 
will depend both on their relative social stand- 
ing and  on the prevailing  wealth standards  at the 
time. Further,  stock prices tend to be more vol- 
atile than  when the spirit  of capitalism  is absent. 
Our work adds to the recent literature  on the 
economic implications of  social norms, cus- 
toms, and culture.'"  Cole et al. (1992)  study 
how the desire to increase social status may 
affect  wealth  accumulation  and  economic 
growth. In some sense, our preference struc- 
ture can be  viewed  as  a parametrization  of 
their wealth-is-status equilibrium. Zou (1992, 
1994)  also  assumes a direct utility function 
that has wealth as a variable to discuss eco- 
nomic growth and savings issues. By focusing 
attention on  implications of  the  capitalistic 
spirit for risk taking and investment behavior, 
our exercise has lead to explicitly-testable re- 
strictions relating concerns for status to stock 
prices and other economic variables.'4  The re- 
ported  empirical  results  are  supportive  of 
the spirit-of-capitalism  hypothesis and the re- 
sulting  asset-pricing model  performs better 
than the standard  expected-utility model. 
As  noted earlier, wealth enters the IMRS 
under both our Model 1 and Epstein and Zin's 
(1991)  parametrized  recursive utility. In our 
discussion, this occurs due to investors' con- 
cern about wealth-induced status, whereas in 
theirs it is due to investors' concern about the 
timing  of  uncertainty resolution. In  reality, 
both types  of  concern may exist  simultane- 
ously. In order for a preference model to cap- 
ture these distinct concerns, one can substitute 
our Model 1, for instance, for the period utility 
in their recursive structure  so that the two con- 
cerns  are  separately parametrized. Such  a 
parametrization  is  potentially useful for em- 
pirical work since it  allows  one  to estimate 
how much the effect of wealth on the IMRS 
is due to the timing concern and how much to 
the status concern. Along the same line, one 
can incorporate  the concern for status into the 
habit-forming preferences of  Constantinides 
(1990)  and John Heaton (1995).  Such exten- 
sions  will  generally be  more complex,  but 
should  nonetheless  make  modelled  prefer- 
ences closer to their real-life counterparts. 
'" See Chaim Fershtman  and Yoram Weiss (1993) for 
more references on this topic. 
'4 For a different study on  wealth-dependent prefer- 
ences and asset prices, see Tzu-Kuan Chiu (1993). 154  THE AMERICAN  ECONOMIC  REVIEW  MARCH 1996 
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF RESULTS 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
Rewrite equation (9)  as follows: 
(Al)  'PAtEfUC(Ct+  At,  Wt*+,?tj  Vt+  At) 
+  Uw(Ct*+At  Wt*+,  t  Vt+At)*At 
UC (C  t*  Wt*,9  Vt) 
x  (I  +P  )} 
for any risky asset i  and the risk-free asset, 
where AP1t,  Pit+A  t  -  Pi,t. Subtracting the 
risk-free asset counterpart  of (Al)  from equa- 
tion (Al)  yields (A2): 
(A2)  EJ  Uc(Ct*+ At  Wt*+  \tg  Vt + At) 
I  uc  U(C  t*  Wt*  ,  Vt) 
+  UW(Ct*+  At  Wt*+  \tg  Vt  +  At)  * At 
UC  (C  t*  Wt*,9  Vt) 
x  (APit  -  roAt)}  0. 
Note  that  the  term  Uw(CC+  *At,  W* 
Atg  Vt+A\t)- At in (A2)  becomes negligible as At 
-+  0. Then, we can take the Taylor series of 
UC(Ct*+At  Wt*+  \t  Vt+At)  around the point 
(C*t,  Wt  , Vt)  in equation (A2)  and apply Ito's 
lemma to the resulting equation. Simplifying 
and  rearranging the  final  terms  will  yield 
equation (12). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman  equation for 
(18)  is 
(A3)  0 =  max{ U(Ct, Wt,  Vt) 
+  Iac  2a  2W2JwW 
+  { Wt  [ro + at(8,-ro)  -Ct  } JW 
+  2cV  2JVV +  IVtJv 
+ ata,  WtV-tpJ  }- 
the first-order  conditions of which are stated 
in  (20)  and  (21).  Conjecturing that  the 
value  function  has  the  form:  J(W,  V)  = 
-t(  Y(W`I-`)/(1  -  y  -  X))V-A,  we substi- 
tute it into (20),  (21),  and (A3)  and solve the 
system jointly for C *, a *  and 77,  which will 
give the desired result. See Merton ( 1971 ) for 
further  details of the solution technique. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
The solution steps are the same as in the 
proof of Proposition 2 except that the conjec- 
tured value function is J(W, V)  =  -'((W  - 
KV)  /''(l  -  y  -A)). 
APPENDIX  B: DATA  DEScRIvrION 
The  variables employed  in  our tests  and 
their sources are explained below: 
Ct: per-capita real consumption in nondur- 
ables  and services  during month t.  Source: 
CITIBASE. It equals real consumption expen- 
ditures divided by the residential population. 
The variable DCONt is the percentage change 
in Ct from month (t-  1) to month t. 
INFt: percentage change in the nondurables 
plus  services  consumption  deflator  from 
month (t  -  1) to t. Source: CITIBASE. 
RDECi,t:  real return  on the ith decile stock 
portfolio in month t,  for i  =  1,  ...  ,  10. The 
decile  portfolios are the  10  standard CRSP 
size-based portfolios, with each monthly re- 
turn for  any  decile -portfolio  given  by  the 
value-weighted  average  of  the  component 
stock returns in that decile. Decile  1 includes 
the smallest  10 percent stocks; decile  2  the 
next smallest 10 percent; and so on. The nom- 
inal returns  on the deciles are then adjusted  by 
the nondurables  and services consumption de- 
flator to get the real returns. The data source 
for the nominal returns is the Center of Re- 
search for Security Prices (CRSP), University 
of Chicago. 
TBILLt:  real return  on one-month Treasury 
bills,  which  is  the  nominal return, obtained 
from Ibbotson  Associates, adjusted  by the non- 
durables  and services consumption  deflator. 
RLTGBt: real return  on a portfolio of long- 
term government bonds  (source:  Roger  G. 
Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield, 1992).  It is 
the nominal return  minus the nondurables  and 
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TABLE  4-SUMMARY  STATISTICS 
Variable  Mean  STD  9l  92  03  06  912  024 
RVWI  0.0053  0.044  0.07  -0.05  0.00  -0.06  0.03  0.00 
RDECI  0.0106  0.082  0.20  0.00  -0.02  -0.03  0.31  0.13 
RDEC5  0.0071  0.061  0.15  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.13  0.01 
RDECIO  0.0047  0.043  0.03  -0.04  0.01  -0.06  0.04  -0.00 
RLTGB  0.0014  0.031  0.05  -0.01  -0.13  0.04  0.04  -0.07 
RLTCB  0.0026  0.026  0.18  -0.03  -0.04  0.07  0.11  -0.04 
TBILL  0.0011  0.002  0.51  0.45  0.36  0.42  0.31  0.24 
TERM  0.0003  0.031  0.04  -0.03  -0.13  0.03  0.03  -0.08 
DEF  0.0015  0.026  0.16  -0.04  -0.05  0.05  0.10  -0.05 
DCON  0.0016  0.004  -0.24  0.06  0.15  0.05  -0.04  -0.15 
INF  0.0039  0.003  0.64  0.60  0.52  0.57  0.45  0.31 
C/W  0.0057  0.002  0.97  0.95  0.93  0.85  0.73  0.55 
Notes: All variables are in monthly values. RDEC, through RDEC,O  are the value-weighted real returns  on the 10 size- 
based portfolios. RVWI is the real return  on the value-weighted index of the NYSE stocks. RLTGB and RLTCB are the 
real returns of a portfolio of long-term government bonds and a portfolio of long-term corporate bonds, respectively. 
TBILL is the nominal Treasury  bill return  minus the nondurables  and services inflation rate. TERM is the total return  on 
a portfolio of long-term government bonds minus the nominal Treasury  bill return.  DEF is the total return  on a portfolio 
of corporate bonds minus the nominal Treasury bill rate. DCON is the real growth rate of per-capita nondurables  plus 
services consumption. INF is the nondurables and services inflation rate. CIW is the consumption-to-wealth ratio. 9r 
denotes autocorrelation  at lag r. The sample period is 1959:1-1991:12  (396 observations). 
RLTCB,: real return  on a portfolio of long- 
term corporate  bonds. It is again the nominal 
return (source:  Ibbotson  and  Sinquefield) 
minus the nondurables and services inflation 
rate. 
TERM,: term premium, which is the differ- 
ence between the nominal return  on a portfolio 
of long-term government bonds and the nom- 
inal  return on  the  Treasury bills  (source: 
Ibbotson and Sinquefield). 
DEF,: default premium, which is the excess 
return on  long-term  corporate bonds  over 
the  short-term interest rate  from  the  one- 
month Treasury bills  (source: Ibbotson and 
Sinquefield). 
RVWI,: real rate of return  on the New York 
Stock Exchange value-weighted index. 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for 
the variables. Many of the stylized facts about 
consumption and asset returns  are known. For 
instance, decile  1 (the smallest firms) has the 
highest average  return  and the highest standard 
deviation while decile 10 has the lowest stan- 
dard deviation and the lowest average return. 
The  average  real-consumption  growth  is 
0.0016  with  a  standard deviation of  0.004, 
which is quite smooth relative to the volatility 
of stock returns. 
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